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Abstract Introduced by Samuelson (Int Econ Rev 16(3):531–538, 1975), the
Serendipity Theorem states that the competitive economy will converge to-
wards the optimum steady-state provided the optimum fertility rate is imposed.
This paper aims at exploring whether the Serendipity Theorem still holds in an
economy with risky lifetime. We show that, under general conditions, including
a perfect annuity market with actuarially fair return, imposing the optimum
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fertility rate and the optimum survival rate leads the competitive economy to
the optimum steady state. That Extended Serendipity Theorem is also shown
to hold in economies where old adults work some fraction of the old age,
whatever the retirement age is fixed or chosen by the agents.
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1 Introduction
Despite significant differences across countries, it is unquestionable that most
economies have, during the last decades, converged from a demographic
equilibrium characterized by a (relatively) high fertility and a (relatively)
low longevity to another equilibrium, with a lower fertility and a higher
longevity. Much attention has been paid, within economics, to that evolution.
In particular, growth theory has, in the recent years, regarded the demographic
equilibrium as an output to be explained and built up several models aimed at
explaining the demographic transition.1
However, there is also another way to look at the demography of an
economy. Actually, one may treat demographic variables as inputs, whose
levels can affect economic outcomes significantly. Indeed, given that fertility
and mortality are major determinants of the functioning of an economy (e.g.,
savings, labor supply, etc.), one may think about their capacity to allow an
economy to reach more or less high standards of living. More precisely, demo-
graphic variables can be regarded as powerful instruments to be influenced.
Such an alternative view leads to the following problem. Suppose that
demographic variables could be controlled perfectly by a government.2 Then,
two questions arise. First, to which values should those demographic variables
be fixed? Second, if those demographic variables can be fixed optimally, to
what extent would these allow a decentralized economy to reach the social
optimum? In other words, would a perfect control of demographic variables
lead a market economy to the optimum?
The second question was first asked and answered by Samuelson (1975),
who highlighted, by means of his Serendipity Theorem, the power of demog-
raphy. Actually, the Serendipity Theorem states that, if there exists a unique
stable steady-state equilibrium in a Diamond-type overlapping generations
(OLG) economy, a competitive economy will converge toward the most
1See Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Doepke (2004), Galor and Moav (2005), De la Croix and
Licandro (2007), and Cervellati and Sunde (2007).
2That assumption is clearly strong. We shall discuss that issue in more details below.
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golden rule steady state provided the optimum fertility rate is imposed.3 That
theoretical result reveals the capacity of demographic variables—in this case,
the fertility rate—to drive the economy toward the social optimum. To put
it differently, when the Serendipity Theorem holds, if governments impose
optimal fertility behavior, then the rest of the economic variables will take
automatically their optimal levels. Thus, Samuelson’s result shows the power
of demography as an instrument allowing for the decentralization of the
long-run social optimum in an otherwise decentralized, perfectly competitive
economy.4
Note, nevertheless, that the scope of Samuelson’s results has been somewhat
qualified by subsequent studies, such as the ones by Deardorff (1976), Michel
and Pestieau (1993), and Jaeger and Kuhle (2009). Whereas those studies cast
an important light on the scope of the Serendipity Theorem, these concentrate
mainly on the characterization of the economic environment under which
Samuelson’s result holds, without refining the demographic environment.
More precisely, those studies all keep the standard Diamond-type OLG
structure, with a given fertility rate, and a fixed length of life equal to two
periods. However, given that the Serendipity Theorem is about demography,
one may want to know whether that result is robust to a finer characterization
of the demography within the model, taking into account, in particular, the
other major demographic variable: the longevity of agents.
The goal of this paper is precisely to re-examine the Serendipity Theorem
in the context of an OLG economy with risky lifetime. In that economy, the
demography becomes two-dimensional: the population size and age structure
depend not only on the fertility rate but also on the survival rate. Does the
Serendipity Theorem still hold in that more general context, and, if yes, under
which conditions?
The present paper proposes to answer that question. For that purpose, we
shall consider a two-period OLG economy with physical capital accumulation,
which is close to the Diamond-type economy studied by Samuelson, but with
a major difference: Unlike in Diamond (where all agents have a life of two
periods of equal length), in our setting only a fraction of each cohort survives
to the second period of life. That economy is actually quite close to the one
whose dynamics is studied in the first part of Chakraborty’s (2004) paper. After
examining whether the Serendipity Theorem still holds in a simple framework
where agents surviving to the second period are retirees, we shall, in a second
3In other words, imposing the optimum fertility makes the competitive economy converge toward
the most golden rule steady state, provided this one exists, is unique and stable. Otherwise, the
convergence would not occur, and the social optimum could not be decentralized by means of the
fertility rate.
4Note that taking demographic variables as inputs does not necessarily legitimate an intervention
by the State. It is the particular approach adopted by Samuelson that treats demographic variables
as instruments of the government, allowing for the decentralization of the social optimum, by
making the solutions of the optimization problems of the social planner and of the agents coincide
(see below).
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stage, introduce labor supply during the second period (firstly as an exogenous
fraction of the old age and then as a fraction chosen by the agents) and consider
its consequences for the Serendipity Theorem.
Throughout this paper, it is assumed, in the spirit of Samuelson, that
fertility and longevity are taken as given by agents but can be controlled by
the social planner without cost. Such an approach is non-standard and looks
like an inversion with respect to common sense. Clearly, a natural way to
think about demographic variables consists of treating these as outputs, which
cannot be directly controlled, but which can only be influenced indirectly,
through some actions affecting the fundamentals of the economy. Samuelson’s
Serendipity Theorem starts from the opposite view, which is also embraced by
the present paper. Undoubtedly, Samuelson’s inversion could be regarded as
quite counterintuitive and, as such, invites some comments at this early stage
of our investigations.
A first thing to be stressed is that assuming that fertility and longevity are
perfectly controllable by the social planner without any cost—and taken as
given by agents—constitutes an obvious simplification, which is only made
here for analytical convenience. As such, the present study should be regarded
as only a starting point inviting further developments.5 It seems of course more
realistic to assume that both agents and the social planner can affect fertility
and mortality indirectly, through economic variables of various kinds, those
economic variables being themselves largely influenced by the demography.
Thus, Samuelson’s approach involves a significant simplification.
Having stressed this, one should not exaggerate the simplification involved
in Samuelson’s inversion. Although we shall not try here to provide a complete
discussion on that complex issue, it should be noted that it is not obvious
at all that economic variables are more easy to control than demographic
variables. One reason why one could argue in favor of Samuelson’s approach
is that demographic variables can, at least, be easily observed, contrary to
most economic variables, which are to a large extent unobservable. Another
reason why one may argue in favor of Samuelson’s approach is related to the
speed of intervention: Trying to influence demographic variables through the
fundamentals of the economy may take ages, whereas simple regulations on,
let us say, fertility can do the job quite quickly, which may be most useful if
governments face, for instance, urgent environmental constraints.
Naturally, none of those arguments is decisive, but at least these suggest
that it is not obvious that Samuelson’s inversion takes necessarily the problem
in the wrong direction. The direction he proposes is also worth being explored,
as a natural companion to studies proposing an indirect control of demographic
variables. Moreover, in any case, Samuelson’s approach allows us to have
a concrete idea of the power of demography, i.e., of its influence on the
5On the optimal cohort growth rate under costly, endogenous fertility, see Abio et al. (2004).
Regarding optimal longevity, De la Croix and Ponthiere (2010) study the optimal accumulation of
capital in the context of a costly longevity.
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functioning of the economy and of its capacity (or incapacity) to lead to
long-run optimality. These are the reasons why we shall pursue Samuelson’s
approach here.
Finally, one should also mention another major difference of Samuelson’s
approach with respect to the rest of the literature. The Serendipity Theorem
is about how a social optimum can be decentralized by means of demographic
variables, and as such, this is a result with a strong normative content, since
this involves the definition of a social optimum. That normative nature of
the Serendipity Theorem is worth being underlined here, since the present
study shares that feature with Samuelson’s work. Note that discussing the
decentralization of a social optimum only makes sense provided the social
optimum is regarded as a reasonable social objective. This requirement is, in
general, strong but becomes even stronger in the context of varying population
sizes (i.e., what Parfit (1984) calls dif ferent numbers choices).6 This is the
reason why we shall pay here particular attention to the definition of the social
optimum and to its treatment of numbers, while remaining in a Samuelson-
type framework.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
characterizes the optimal fertility rate and survival rate and re-examines the
Serendipity Theorem. Section 4 introduces (exogenous) second-period labor
and discusses the Serendipity Theorem in that context. Section 5 considers the
case of endogenous old-age labor. Concluding remarks are drawn in Section 6.
2 The model
Let us consider a standard, Diamond-type OLG economy with physical capital
accumulation. All agents live a first period of life (of length normalized to
1) for sure, during which they supply their labor inelastically and save some
resources for their old days.
Each young adult has also n children during the first period. Hence, the
labor force, denoted by Lt, follows the dynamic law:
Lt+1 = Ltn
where n can be interpreted as the fertility rate.
However, unlike in Diamond (1965), not all agents survive to the second
period: Only a fraction π of the young cohort reaches the old age. In other
words, life expectancy at birth in that economy equals 1 + π . Hence, the
population at time t can be written as
Nt = Lt + π Lt−1
= Lt−1(n + π)
6On the difficulties raised by population ethics, see Blackorby et al. (2005).
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The production of an output Yt involves capital Kt and labor Lt, according
to the function
Yt = F(Kt, Lt) = F¯(Kt, Lt) + (1 − δ)Kt
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.7 The production function F¯ (Kt, Lt)
is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one. Hence, the total production
function F(Kt, Lt) is also homogeneous of degree one, and the production
process as a whole can be rewritten in intensive terms as
yt = f (kt)
where kt denotes the capital per worker, while we have f ′(k) > 0 and
f ′′(k) < 0.8
The resource constraint of the economy, stating that what is produced is
either consumed or invested, is:
F(Kt, Lt) = ct Lt + dtπ Lt−1 + Kt+1
At the steady state and in intensive terms, we have
f (k) − nk = c + π d
n
(1)
Individual preferences are assumed to be represented by a function having
the expected utility form, with a temporal utility function u(.) increasing and
concave in consumption. Hence, provided the utility of death is normalized to
zero, individual expected lifetime utility takes the form u(c) + πu(d) where c
and d denote first- and second-period consumptions. We assume u′(.) > 0 and
u′′(.) < 0.
3 Optimum fertility rate and survival rate
In order to consider what the Serendipity Theorem becomes in the economy
under study, we shall first consider the social planner’s problem and derive the
optimum levels of the fertility rate n and the survival rate π .
3.1 The planner’s problem
Consider how the fertility rate n and survival rate π can be chosen in such
a way as to reach the best of the optima, that is, the optimum optimorum.
The problem of the social planner consists of choosing consumptions c, d, and
capital k and demographic variables n and π in such a way as to maximize the
social objective function, subject to the resource constraint of the economy.
7That function is used by De la Croix and Michel (2002, p. 4).
8More precisely, k denotes the capital per young agent. In Sections 4 and 5, we will allow old
agents to work, so that capital per young agent and capital per worker will then differ.
How powerful is demography? The Serendipity Theorem revisited 905
Throughout this paper, we will follow Samuelson (1975) and adopt, as
a social objective function, the average lifetime welfare at the steady state.
That particular social objective invites two comments. Firstly, as this is well-
known in the population ethics literature (see Blackorby et al. 2005), taking
the average welfare rather than, let us say, the total welfare is far from neutral
for different numbers choices, since this reveals a concern for the quality of
lives rather than the quantity of lives. We shall come back to the consequences
of that particular social objective for the issue at stake. Secondly, our emphasis
on the steady-state welfare leads to neglect the interests of generations living in
the transition and, as such, is an imperfect social objective. Nonetheless, given
that, by definition of the steady state, an infinitely large number of generations
will enjoy the living conditions prevailing at the steady state that exclusive
focus on the steady state can be regarded as a reasonable proxy.
The problem of the social planner can be written as:
max
c,d,k,n,π
u(c) + πu(d) subject to (1)




f ′(k) = n (3)








u(d) − du′(d) = 0 (6)
Condition 2 describes the optimal distribution of resources among generations,
while condition 3 describes the optimum capital accumulation pattern. Ex-
pression 4 is the feasibility constraint. Taken together, those three conditions
characterize usually the optimal levels of c, d, and k for given levels of n and π .
Condition 5 defines implicitly the optimum fertility rate: As stressed by Jaeger
and Kuhle (2009), it makes explicit the trade-off between the negative capital





, whose size depends positively on the survival rate π . Those two effects
of fertility are playing in opposite directions, so that there seems to be some
intuitive support for the existence of an interior optimum fertility rate. Given
that the extra-value of the present study lies in the introduction of mortality,
9In the spirit of Samuelson’s work, we will focus mainly here on conditions characterizing an
interior optimum. However, we will discuss the plausibility of a corner optimum survival rate
below. Note also that we assume, like Samuelson, that the social optimum is unique, that is, that
only one set of variables satisfy the above FOCs. This guarantees that our optimum is necessarily
a global optimum.
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we will, for the sake of presentation, assume, in the rest of this paper, that the
optimum fertility rate is an interior optimum.10
Let us now pay more attention to condition 6, which characterizes the
interior optimum survival rate. Condition 6 states that the marginal welfare
gain from a higher survival prospect, u(d), should be equal to the marginal
cost of a higher survival prospect, which is given by du′(d). That condition is
necessary for the existence of an interior optimum survival rate.





where the LHS is the fear of ruin, a measure of risk-aversion.
Under which circumstances is condition 6 satisfied? Whether u(d) is inferior,
equal, or superior to du′(d) depends on several properties of the economy. A
first determinant consists of the shape of the temporal utility function u(.) and,
in particular, of its intercept.11 If u(0) > 0 or u(0) = 0, then, given the concavity
of u(.), it is always the case that u(d) exceeds du′(d) for d > 0, so that the
optimum survival rate π∗ equals 1. On the contrary, if u(0) < 0, then we may
have an interior optimum π∗ or not, depending on the level of second-period
consumption at the social optimum. This leads us to a second determinant of
π∗: the production capacity of the economy, as captured by the production
function f (kt). If the production technique is efficient, optimum output and
consumption levels are high, so that it is likely that π∗ is strictly positive,
despite a negative intercept. On the contrary, if the production technique is
not efficient, optimum second-period consumption is low, and then, under
u(0) < 0, we have π∗ equal to 0.12
One can illustrate that discussion on the interiority of π∗ by means of the
concept of value of a statistical life.
Remark The value of a statistical life (VSL) is defined as the shadow price of






10Readers interested in the interiority or non-interiority of the optimum fertility rate can refer to
Deardorff (1976), Michel and Pestieau (1993), and Abio (2003).
11To illustrate the crucial role played by the shape of u(·), the Appendix, Electronic Supplemen-
tary Material concentrates on the case of a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES)
utility function with an intercept.
12In that case, the low production capacity, by restraining consumption below a level making a life-
period enjoyable, makes a short life better than a long life from the perspective of total lifetime
welfare.
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The derivative dU/dπ is taken assuming that all the consumption effort
required to induce a longer life bears on the second period:
dU
dπ
= u(d) + πu′(d) dd
dπ
The term dd/dπ is computed using Eq. 1:
dd
dπ









= u(d) − du
′(d)
u′(d)
which is positive only provided u(d) − du′(d) > 0.
If the value of a statistical life at the social optimum is positive, the condition
for an interior optimum survival rate is unlikely to be satisfied, as we have
u(d) − du′(d) > 0 (7)
Thus, if the VSL is positive at the social optimum, the optimum survival
rate is not an interior solution, but a corner solution, equal to π∗ = 1. On the
contrary, if, at the social optimum, the VSL is negative, we have
u(d) − du′(d) < 0 (8)
so that the condition 6 is never satisfied, and we have the other corner solution:
π = 0. It is thus only in the special case of a zero VSL at the optimum that
condition 6 holds.
In sum, whether condition 6, 7, or 8 prevails depends on the shape of
individual temporal utility functions and on the level of old-age consumption
at the social optimum. In general, it is widely acknowledged in the empirical
literature on VSL estimates that the VSL is positive and is increasing in the
level of wealth. Hence, if, at the laissez-faire, the VSL is positive (which is the
case) and if the social optimum involves a higher old-age consumption than
the laissez-faire (which is also plausible), the VSL must also be positive at the
social optimum (as the VSL is increasing in d), implying that u(d) − du′(d) > 0
holds, so that the optimum survival rate is, under those assumptions, a corner
solution.
Therefore, in the rest of this paper, we shall take that possibility into
account and derive our results for an interior optimum survival rate 0 < π∗ < 1
and a corner solution π∗ = 1. On the contrary, we shall leave aside the—
unrealistic—case where π∗ = 0.13
Finally, it should be noted that the above first-order conditions are neces-
sary, but not sufficient, for (c, d, k, n, π) to be a maximum. Actually, a
sufficient condition for a maximum is that the first-order derivatives are equal
13Actually, that case seems implausible for advanced economies with large production capacities.
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to zero and that the Hessian matrix of this optimization problem is negative
definite. The second-order conditions are:14
(π)2u′′(c)
n
+ nπu′′(d) < 0 (9)
nπu′(d) f ′′(k)
[







f ′′(k) + (n)2u′(d) [π(n + 2k f ′′(k))u′′(c)]
]
−πu′(d)((n)3 + 2dπ f ′′(k))u′′(d) < 0 (11)
−(d)2(n)3π [u′(d)]2 [u′(d) f ′′(k) + (n + 2k f ′′(k))u′′(c)] u′′(d) > 0
(12)
Conditions 9 and 10 are, by the concavity of the temporal utility u (·) and of
the production function f (·), always verified. However, the same is not true
for conditions 11 and 12. It is actually quite difficult to see whether those two
conditions are likely to be satisfied. To discuss this, it is necessary to impose
particular functional forms for the temporal utility u (·) and for the production
function f (·).15
3.2 The Serendipity Theorem
Let us now consider a competitive economy and assume that a steady-state
equilibrium exists and is unique and stable. Factors are paid at their marginal
productivity:
w = f (k) − kf ′(k) (13)
R = f ′(k) (14)
where w is the wage, while R is the return on capital.
For the sake of space constraints, the existence and uniqueness of a station-
ary equilibrium are not discussed here formally. However, provided agents are
expected utility maximizers, and provided there is a perfect annuity market
with actuarially fair returns, it can be shown that an equilibrium exists under
the assumptions identified by De la Croix and Michel (2002, chapter 1): u′(c) >
0, u′′(c) < 0, and limct→0 u′ (c) = +∞, as well as, for all k > 0, f (k) > 0, f ′(k) >
0, and f ′′(k) < 0. Moreover, the condition guaranteeing the uniqueness of a
14See the Appendix, Electronic Supplementary Material for the derivation.
15In the Appendix, Electronic Supplementary Material, we derive the FOCs and SOCs in the
special case of a CIES utility function and a Cobb–Douglas production function and discuss the
cases under which those conditions are satisfied.
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stationary equilibrium in De la Croix and Michel (2002, p. 34) can also be
easily extended to the case of risky lifetime. Note, however, that the risk of
death has an ambiguous effect on the uniqueness condition, as it affects both
the time horizon and the savings return (see Chakraborty 2004).
The problem faced by a young agent is to choose his optimal savings
subject to his budget constraint. Following the literature, we assume that there
exists a perfect annuity market here, which yields an actuarially fair return on
savings.16 Hence, under that assumption, the second period consumption is
d = Rs
π
where s denotes individual savings. Under w = c + s, the lifetime budget
constraint of the agent can be written as
w = c + π d
R
(15)
Under those assumptions, the problem of a young agent can thus be written as
max
c,d
u(c) + πu(d) subject to w = c + π d
R
It should be stressed here that the objective function of the agent, which
consists of his expected lifetime welfare, coincides formally with the average
lifetime utility when evaluated ex post, which consists of nothing else than the
social planner’s objective. Thus, even though the optimization problems of the
social planner and the agent are fundamentally different, there is an interesting
similarity in the functional forms of the objective functions, thanks to the
coincidence between the ex post average lifetime welfare (i.e., the objective
of the planner) and the ex ante expected lifetime welfare (i.e., the objective of
the agent).




Finally, in equilibrium, capital equals savings:
nk = s = w − c (17)
For given (n, π), a stationary competitive equilibrium is a vector (w˜, R˜, c˜, d˜, k˜)
satisfying Eqs. 13–17.
16That assumption, which is most common in the literature (see Chakraborty 2004), involves a
strong simplification, since annuity markets are largely underdeveloped in the real world (see
Brown 2007). Note, however, that the Serendipity Theorem concerns a perfectly competitive
economy, so that assuming perfect annuity markets seems to be the most natural assumption for
the purpose at hand.
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Assume that n is at its optimum value n, i.e., Eq. 5 holds. Then, the market
conditions 13–17 would coincide with the optimal conditions 2, 3, and 4. If
we abstracts from the survival rate, this result coincides with the standard
Serendipity Theorem: Imposing the optimum fertility rate suffices to bring the
economy at the optimum steady state.
However, the condition 6 for an interior optimum survival rate—or condi-
tions 7 and 8 for a corner optimum survival rate—does not follow automatically
from individual behavior under the optimum fertility rate and may remain non-
satisfied if only the optimum fertility rate is imposed.
Nevertheless, if the social planner can impose both the optimum fertility
rate and the optimum survival rate (assumed to be strictly positive), then we
see from the above FOCs that all the other variables of the economy take their
optimum values. The following proposition summarizes the results.17
Proposition 1 Suppose that there exists a unique and stable steady-state equilib-
rium with a positive capital k > 0.
Assume that conditions 2–6, and 9–12 hold, then, if the government imposes
n and π, the economy will converge toward the optimum steady state, which
involves 0 < n < +∞ and 0 < π < 1.
Assume that conditions 2–5, 7, and 9–11 hold, then, if the government imposes
n and π, the economy will converge toward the optimum steady state, which
involves 0 < n < +∞ and π = 1.
Therefore, the introduction of survival rates in the OLG framework does
not invalidate the Serendipity Theorem.18 However, it is true that, in that
extended framework, a government can only drive the economy toward its
optimum steady state provided it imposes both the optimum fertility rate and
the optimum survival rate. In general (i.e., provided the optimum old-age
consumption is sufficiently large), the optimum π is equal to 1, so that the
Serendipity Theorem requires here to impose maximal and riskless longevity
for all, in such a way as to reach the optimum long-run equilibrium.
At this stage, it should be stressed that the above Extended Serendipity
Theorem relies on a particular set of assumptions. Let us provide here a
brief, preliminary discussion of the robustness of the Extended Serendipity
Theorem, to be followed by further developments in the next sections of this
paper.
17Note that, in the case where the optimum survival rate π is zero, this Extended Serendipity
Theorem does not hold. Indeed, if the social planner imposes π = 0 to individuals, these will not
save any more. As a consequence, we have, at the steady state, k = 0, whereas the Serendipity
Theorem focuses on steady states with a strictly positive capital level.
18Note also that if agents could, at the laissez-faire, affect their survival probability (e.g., through
health spending), then there may be a difference between the laissez-faire and the social optimum,
as agents may ignore the effect of their health investment on the return of their savings, and choose
a non-optimal level of health investment (see Becker and Philipson 1998). This possibility does not
arise here, where agents take the demographic parameters n and π as given.
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A first, important issue to be discussed regarding the robustness of our
results concerns the modeling of longevity. Actually, it should be stressed
that the particular way in which mortality is introduced in our model does
not seem determinant for the validity of the Extended Serendipity Theorem.
More precisely, there exist two main ways to introduce mortality in a two-
period OLG model, and our result is robust to adopting the other modeling
of longevity. That alternative modeling would not involve risk but, rather,
would consist of a second period of length h lived by all agents (h being
between 0 and 1).19 An obvious cost of that alternative modeling is that the
absence of risk makes the model less realistic, but, at the same time, there
is a gain from the fact that we do not need there to assume perfect annuity
markets, precisely because risk has disappeared. One can check that, under
that alternative setting, the FOCs of the social planner’s problem and of the
agent’s problem would remain exactly as they are in our framework (except,
of course, that π is replaced by h). As a consequence, the Extended Serendipity
Theorem would still hold under that alternative modeling of longevity.20
While the Extended Serendipity Theorem is robust to how longevity is
modeled, the same cannot be said for several other aspects of the model.
The Extended Serendipity Theorem consists, in the same way as Samuelson’s
theorem, of a happy coincidence result, which relies on some assumptions
allowing for the formal similarity of the FOCs describing the solutions of the
social planner and the agent’s problems. An important assumption consists
of the formal similarity between the objective functions of the social planner
and of the agent, as mentioned above. If, for instance, the social planner was
a critical-level utilitarian planner, then this would introduce a difference be-
tween the two functional forms at stake and would make the happy coincidence
disappear.21 Alternatively, if agents were not expected utility maximizers but
had different preferences, the formal similarity between the two objective
functions would also disappear, and the Extended Serendipity Theorem may
also collapse. Moreover, the assumption of a perfect annuity market yielding
an actuarially fair return, which amounts to assume a perfect division of the
risk of death on the whole cohort, is also the most convenient way to minimize
the differences between the social planner’s problem and the agent’s problem,
which yields, in f ine, the happy coincidence. Relaxing that assumption may not
preserve the Extended Serendipity Theorem. Note, however, that this point
19In that alternative framework, life expectancy is equal to 1 + h, against 1 + π in the present
setting, but the difference is that survival curves would then be perfectly rectangular (see Jouvet
et al. 2010).
20Note also that there exists a third way to introduce longevity in a two-period setting: This consists
of making agents face a probability π to enjoy a second period of length h, which yields a life
expectancy equal to 1 + πh (see Ponthiere 2009). Under that alternative framework, the Extended
Serendipity Theorem would still hold provided perfect annuity markets and average utilitarianism
are assumed.
21Under critical-level utilitarianism, the social objective function is not an average of individual
utilities, but a sum of individual utilities net of a critical welfare level (which, by definition, makes
a life neutral from the perspective of social welfare).
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should not surprise us, since the assumption of perfectly competitive markets
was already playing a crucial role in Samuelson’s initial result. This remains
true in our extended framework.
Those remarks suffice to highlight that, exactly as Samuelson’s initial re-
sult, the Extended Serendipity Theorem is dependent on a conjunction of
hypotheses. In Samuelson’s model, the survival probability was fixed to 1
and not chosen by the planner. As a consequence, controlling for the fertility
rate was similar to controlling for the whole demography. On the contrary, in
our extended framework, both the fertility rate and survival rate need to be
controlled to decentralize the social optimum. That result could have been
expected, since, here again, controlling for both n and π coincides with a
control of the whole demography. Note, however, that the above observations
suggest that the extension is not as automatic as it may appear at first glance,
since this requires particular assumptions allowing for the happy coincidence.
In the rest of this paper, we shall now explore the robustness of the Extended
Serendipity Theorem further, by refining other aspects of our model.
4 Exogenous old-age labor
Whereas Section 3 showed that the introduction of mortality within an OLG
economy does not invalidate, but only leads to a re-qualification, of the
Serendipity Theorem, it may be argued that the introduction of mortality was,
in the above framework, not capturing the overall effect of ageing on the
economy. The reason why one may remain unsatisfied is that the above model
treats all survivors to the second period as retirees.
Actually, that assumption is not fully realistic because one may expect that,
as the life expectancy grows, the working time grows also. But besides the
issue of realism, one may also argue that the precise way in which mortality
was introduced in Section 3, by leaving the labor supply unchanged, may
not be neutral as far as the validity of the Extended Serendipity Theorem is
concerned. Thus, it is worth exploring here whether our results are robust to a
more general modeling where the survival rate π affects the total labor supply
through its impact on old-age labor.22
Hence, this section aims at complementing the basic model developed
above by a more realistic one, where agents surviving to the second period
can also take part in the production process. This will be the opportu-
nity to evaluate the robustness of the Extended Serendipity Theorem to a
more general modeling of the life cycle. Undoubtedly, introducing old-age
labor adds additional connections between fertility and mortality, as we shall
now see.
22Actually, mortality, as introduced in Section 3, does not affect the proportion of current savers
with respect to future workers, which is a key ratio explaining why the demography matters in the
theory of optimal capital accumulation. We explore here what happens when π affects that ratio.
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Let us now assume that the surviving old agents work an exogenous fraction
λ of the second period, with 0 < λ < 1.23 Hence, the total labor force becomes





Production still involves capital and labor as before. For simplicity, it is
assumed that old workers have the same productivity as young ones (i.e., they








Hence, under CRS, production can be written, in intensive terms, as
yt = F
(
kt, 1 + λπn
)
where yt is the output per young adult and kt is the capital per young adult.








− Ltct − π Lt−1dt
Hence we have, at the steady state,
F
(
k, 1 + λπ
n
)
− nk = c + π d
n
(18)
4.1 The social planner’s problem
Under that alternative framework, the problem of the social planner becomes
max
c,d,k,n,π
u(c) + πu(d) subject to (18)

































u(d) − du′(d) + FL
(




λu′(d) = 0 (23)
23Note that there may exist other ways to introduce old-age labor in the present framework. Here
we adopted the most convenient formalization.
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In comparison with the basic model, the second condition is different, as the
marginal productivity of capital depends on the survival rate, unlike what used
to prevail before. Similarly, the condition 21—the feasibility constraint—is also
affected by old-age workers: The survival rate has here a positive effect on the
feasible set.
There is another difference with the basic model (i.e., condition 5): Condi-
tion 22, which characterizes the optimum fertility rate, contains an additional
term, the third one, which captures the negative effect of n on the output per
young worker yt.24 The two other effects are the same as in the standard model.
Thus, if we compare the optimum interior fertility under old-age labor (i.e.,
λ > 0), we see that the optimum n is likely to be smaller than without old-age
labor (i.e., λ = 0).
Condition 23 characterizes the interior optimum survival rate. Here again,
there is an additional term in comparison with condition 6, which captures the
positive effect of a higher survival rate on the labor force and, hence, on the
output per young worker. That additional, positive term is likely to reinforce
the likelihood of a corner solution for optimum π , i.e., for π = 1:
u(d) − du′(d) + FL
(
k, 1 + λπ
n
)
λu′(d) > 0 (24)
Hence, the positive influence of the survival rate on the feasibility set makes
the condition for the corner solution π = 0, which is
u(d) − du′(d) + FL
(
k, 1 + λπ
n
)
λu′(d) < 0 (25)
even less plausible than under no old-age labor (i.e., λ = 0).




+ nπu′′(d) < 0 (26)
nπu′(d)FKK
[















 + (n)3	 + (π)2 F2KL
 − (π)2 FLL
]
> 0 (29)
24That additional negative effect tends to counteract the standard intergenerational transfer effect












The standard intergenerational transfer effect (i.e., the second term) is here reduced by the fact
that old agents do not only consume but also produce (under λ > 0), as shown by the second term
in brackets.
25See the Appendix, Electronic Supplementary Material for the derivation.
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with
ϕ ≡ πu′′(c) + (n)2u′′(d)
 ≡ 2(n)2πFKL














 ≡ (n)2π (u′(d))2 + u′′(c) (2k(n)2πu′(d) + λ2 (−F2Lu′′(d)
))
,
 ≡ u′′(c) [(n)2π (n + 2kFKK
)













Conditions 26 and 27 are identical to conditions 9 and 10 of the model without
old-age labor. As in the basic model, those conditions are always satisfied given
the concavity of the temporal utility function and of the production function.
However, conditions 28 and 29 differ from conditions 11 and 12. Moreover,
those two conditions are not necessarily satisfied.
4.2 The Serendipity Theorem
We now look at the competitive steady state assuming that it is unique and














n + λπ (30)
R = Fk
(




We can now consider the problem faced by a young agent, who chooses his
optimal savings subject to his budget constraint. Under a perfect annuity mar-
ket with an actuarially fair return on savings, the second-period consumption




Under w = c + s, the budget constraint of the agent can be written as
w =
(











subject to the above budget constraint. From the FOCs, we have the same
equation as before, i.e., Eq. 16. Finally, in equilibrium, capital equals savings,
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i.e., Eq. 17 holds. For given (n, π), a stationary competitive equilibrium is a
vector (w˜, R˜, c˜, d˜, k˜) satisfying Eqs. 16, 17, and 30–32.
Assume that n is at its optimum value n, i.e., Eq. 22 holds. Then, the market
conditions 16, 17, and 30–32 would coincide with the optimal conditions 19–
21. Thus, once old-age labor is introduced (λ > 0), and if we abstract from
the choice of the optimal survival rate, the Serendipity Theorem still holds:
Imposing the optimum fertility rate suffices to bring the economy at the
optimum steady state.
Once we consider the choice of the optimal survival rate, it is clear, here
again, that the condition 23 for an interior optimum survival rate—or the
conditions 24 and 25 for a corner optimum survival rate—do not follow
automatically from individual behavior under the optimum fertility rate.
Nevertheless, if the social planner can impose both the optimum fertility rate
and the optimum survival rate (still assumed to be strictly positive), then, here
again, all the other variables of the economy take also their optimum values.
The only difference with respect to the basic model consists of the levels of
those optimum levels. The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 2 Suppose that there exists a unique and stable steady-state equilib-
rium with a positive capital k > 0.
Assume that conditions 19–23, and 26–29 hold, then, if the government
imposes n and π, the economy will converge toward the optimum steady state,
which involves 0 < n < +∞ and 0 < π < 1.
Assume that conditions 19–22, 24, and 26–28, then, if the government imposes
n and π, the economy will converge toward the optimum steady state, which
involves 0 < n < +∞ and π = 1.
Therefore, the introduction of old-age labor does not invalidate the Ex-
tended Serendipity Theorem. Naturally, it is true that, under the possibility
of second-period work, the incentive to save is likely to be reduced, so that
the mere existence of a steady-state equilibrium with a strictly positive capital
level becomes here a stronger assumption. However, provided the existence,
uniqueness, and stability of the stationary equilibrium still hold, Proposition
2 tells us that if the government can impose the optimum levels of n and π—
which differ from their levels in the basic model—then it is still guaranteed
that the economy will converge toward the optimum steady state. In sum,
the introduction of old-age labor only changes the level of the target for the
fertility rate n—and, possibly, the one for π—but not the possibility to reach
the social optimum by merely imposing the optimum pair (n, π).
5 Endogenous old-age labor
Finally, let us conclude our re-examination of the Serendipity Theorem by
considering the case where old-age labor is chosen by agents when being young
and where there exists some disutility from old-age labor. While assuming
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that agents choose the length of their working time is not fully realistic
(strong legislative limitations still prevail in some countries), it may be worth,
nonetheless, to develop that alternative case, to see how robust our results are
to the exogeneity of old-age labor supply.
Assume now that young adults choose their old-age working time by
maximizing their expected lifetime welfare
u(ct) + πu(dt+1) − πv(λt+1)
where v(·) denotes the disutility of second-period labor.26 We assume that the
disutility of old-age labor is a strictly increasing, convex function. We also have
limλt+1→0 v′ (λt+1) = 0 and limλt+1→1 v′ (λt+1) = +∞.
Note that this modeling of the retirement decision implies that agents
choose their retirement age at the same time as they choose their savings, that
is, at the beginning of their life. It may be argued that, in real life, agents choose
their retirement age at a higher age, but here we prefer assuming, for analytical
simplicity, that each agent has a unique decision node, so that his whole life
plan (savings and retirement age) is necessarily consistent.27
As above, production still involves capital and labor. For simplicity, it is still













is the total labor force. The only difference with respect to
the previous section is that the old-age labor time λt is now endogenous. Under
CRS, production can be written, in intensive terms, as
yt = F
(
kt, 1 + λtπn
)
where yt is the output per young adult and kt is the capital per young adult.
5.1 The social planner’s problem
Under that alternative framework, the problem of the social planner becomes
max
c,d,k,λ,n,π
u(c) + πu(d) − πv(λ) subject to (18)
26That modeling is close to the one in Hu (1979) and De la Croix et al. (2004) but for risky
longevity.
27Note, however, that the agent’s objective function is, in our model, additive over time, so that
the decision concerning the retirement age is necessarily time consistent.
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u(d) − du′(d) + FL
(




λu′(d) − v(λ) = 0 (38)
In comparison with the previous section, there is here an additional FOC
(Eq. 35), concerning the optimal old-age labor λ. It states that the old-age
labor is optimal when the marginal gain in utility terms from working one








In comparison with the model with exogenous λ (i.e., condition 22), condi-
tion 37, which characterizes the optimum fertility rate, exhibits no explicit
difference. However, it is likely to yield another optimum n because consump-
tions and old-age labor take other values than in Eq. 27, as FL
(
k, 1 + λπn
) =
v′(λ)/u′(d) under the optimal λ.
Condition 38 characterizes the interior optimum survival rate. There is
here an additional, negative term in comparison with condition 23. That term
captures the negative effect of a higher survival rate on old-age utility given
old-age labor. The condition for a corner solution π = 1 is now:
u(d) − du′(d) + FL
(
k, 1 + λπ
n
)
λu′(d) − v(λ) > 0 (40)
The condition for the corner solution π = 0 becomes
u(d) − du′(d) + FL
(
k, 1 + λπ
n
)
λu′(d) − v(λ) < 0 (41)
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Finally, the second-order conditions for a maximum include now an addi-
tional condition, relative to the optimal level of old-age labor. Hence, we have
now five conditions. To save space, we only report here the first three ones.
(π)2u′′(c)
n
+ nπu′′(d) < 0 (42)
FKK
[
πu′′(c) + (n)2u′′(d)] > 0 (43)
− [(π)2 F2KLu′(d)
(




(π)2 FLLu′(d) − nπv′′(λ)
) (
πu′′(c) + (n)2u′′(d)) < 0 (44)
Conditions 42 and 43 are the same as in the previous section because the
first-order conditions for optimal d and k are formally identical whatever λ is
exogenous or endogenous. However, condition 44 differs from its counterparts
in the previous Section (i.e., expression 28). Whereas conditions 42 and 43 are
necessarily satisfied (thanks to the concavity of u(·) and F (·, ·)), the same is not
true for the other conditions. Only particular assumptions on the functional
forms would allow us to say more about their fulfillment.
5.2 The Serendipity Theorem
Consider now the competitive economy. As before, factors are paid at their
marginal productivity, i.e., Eqs. 30 and 31 hold.
The young agent chooses his savings and old-age labor supply subject to his
budget constraint. The problem of a young agent can be written as
max
c,d,λ
u(c) + πu(d) − πv(λ)
subject to the lifetime budget constraint (Eq. 32).
From the FOCs, we have the Euler equation 16 and an additional condition
related to labor supply:
πv′(λ) = u′(c)
(







Finally, in equilibrium, capital equals savings, i.e., Eq. 17 holds.
For given (n, π), a stationary competitive equilibrium is a vector (w˜, R˜, c˜,
d˜, k˜, λ˜) satisfying Eqs. 16, 17, 30–32, and 45. If n is fixed at its optimum level,
so that condition 37 holds, satisfied, then it follows that conditions 16, 17, and
30–32 imply the optimal rules 33, 34 and 36.
However, in comparison with the previous section, we now have an addi-
tional condition characterizing the social optimum: condition 35, which char-
acterizes the optimal old-age labor. Can this be obtained from the individual’s
decision, described by condition 45? Actually, it can be shown that imposing
the optimal values of demographic parameters n and π suffices to induce the
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optimal old-age working time. To see this, let us first substitute for R = n and
















k, 1 + λπn
) = Rk + w (1 + λπn
)
and given Eq. 16, we have
v′(λ) = u′(d)FL
(




which coincides with condition 35. Thus, imposing π and n suffices to
decentralize the optimum retirement age. Endogenizing the old-age labor does
not break the Extended Serendipity Theorem.
Proposition 3 Suppose that there exists a unique and stable steady-state equilib-
rium with a positive capital k > 0.
Assume that the f irst-order conditions 33–38 and the second-order conditions
for a maximum hold, then, if the government imposes n and π, the economy
will converge toward the optimum steady state, which involves 0 < n < +∞
and 0 < π < 1.
Assume that the f irst-order conditions 33–37 and 40 and the second-order
conditions for a maximum hold, then, if the government imposes n and π,
the economy will converge toward the optimum steady state, which involves 0 <
n < +∞ and π = 1.
Undoubtedly, Proposition 3 illustrates the robustness of the Extended
Serendipity Theorem studied in the previous sections. Controlling for demo-
graphic conditions (n, π) leads to the optimum steady state not only in a
world where agents either do not work when being old (Proposition 1) or
do work during some fixed period (Proposition 2) but also in a world where
agents organize their working life plans by themselves (Proposition 3). Hence,
the capacity to decentralize the optimum steady state on the mere basis of
demographic controls is robust to the endogenization of the retirement age.28
6 Conclusion
Despite the large attention that was paid to the economic environment (i.e.,
utility and production functions) under which Samuelson’s Serendipity The-
orem holds, little had been said on the conditions of the demographic envi-
ronment guaranteeing that result. The present paper aimed at re-examining
28However, that robustness of the Extended Serendipity Theorem remains conditional on the
particular way in which old-age labor is modeled in our framework. The present work has thus
no pretension to exhaustiveness and could be complemented by additional robustness studies (see
below).
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whether the Serendipity Theorem still holds under a richer demographic
structure.
For that purpose, we developed a two-period OLG model with risky lifetime
and showed that if there exists only one stable steady state, then, provided
the government can impose the optimum levels of the fertility rate and of
the survival rate, all other economic variables will take their optimum values,
that is, the optimum optimorum will be reached. That result was also shown to
hold—but with different targets—in a more general framework, where adults
surviving to the old age are allowed to work a fraction of the second period,
whatever that fraction is exogenously fixed or endogenously chosen by agents.
Hence, the introduction of mortality in a Diamond-type economy does not
infirm the Serendipity Theorem, as the imposition of the optimum fertility
rate is still beneficial here, even though this is no longer sufficient to reach
the optimum optimorum, which requires also the optimum survival rate to be
imposed. This paper tends thus to emphasize, in some sense, a limitation of
the Serendipity Theorem, as one cannot, by the use of a single demographic
control, reach the best steady state: Longevity must also be controlled for, and
its level affects the optimum level of fertility. The two demographic dimensions
must thus be treated together.
Finally, it should be stressed that the extended version of the Serendipity
Theorem considered here relies on several assumptions, which should be
relaxed in future works. There are three major assumptions to be discussed
further. Firstly, the possibility to keep the Serendipity Theorem in the context
of risky lifetime relies on the existence of a perfect annuity market. Without
it, the question of whether fixing the optimal pair (n, π) suffices to induce
the optimum steady state would become more complex. Given the under-
development of annuity markets in real life, a natural direction for future
research would consist of reconsidering the Serendipity Theorem under alter-
native assumptions on the savings of the dead. Secondly, one may also want to
explore the consequences from relaxing the average utilitarian social welfare
function postulated throughout this paper. Actually, the population ethics lit-
erature emphasized the difficulties, when facing different-numbers choices, to
adhere to a particular social objective. Hence, exploring the robustness of the
Serendipity Theorem to various definitions of the social objective is a natural
direction for future works.29 Thirdly, the introduction of costs for controlling
fertility and survival would also be most welcome, since in reality the control
of demographic variables is definitely costly. Note that relaxing those three
assumptions would involve significant departures from Samuelson’s approach
and, also, much additional complexity. Therefore, those robustness checks are
left for future research.
29Note that, more generally, additional discussions on the normative foundations of Samuelson’s
approach would also be welcome, since one may accuse such an instrumental use of demographic
variables of excess normativism. But such discussions on the normative foundations of population
economics would require an entire paper on their own and are thus left for future research.
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